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The Commission adopted on  2nd December 1998 a report on· "How the EU  is tack-
ling the Year 2000 Computing Problem" (Y2K). which was presented to the Euro-
pean Council in Vienna. The purpos~ of the Communication was to provide an over- : 
· view <>f  Member 'state preparations ·and  progress in  addressing this problem and to 
identify the areas where progress may have been inadequate and  action needed to 
be taken. 
The ·Vienna  European Council subsequently requested .the  Commission to "convene 
a meeting of  representatives of the public infrastructure providers from  the  Member: 
.  States to establish whether the cross-border dependencies within the EU in ar-· 
eas  such as  transport,  energy,  and water ·supply are being adequately ad-
dressed and to  recomm~nd appropriate action  where  required .  to  the  next 
European Council"  . 
. This Report responds to this mandate. lr doing so,  it recognises that any assessment 
of the!potential cross-border impact of the Y2K issue must take as  its starting. point 
the level of preparedness iri and between sectors at a national level, ·as well as  the 
availability of verified  and  authorised  information.  Additionally,  the  report looks  be-
. yond  .~he Union's  borde~s  ·to th.ose  areas and  countries where the effect of the  Y2K 
issue has the greatest  potential to impact on the sitLJation of the EU.itself  ... 
Whilst intensive work has been on-going on the Y2K issue in most areas over the  las~ 
18 months, it is clear that a further intensification of efforts is required  by the private 
sector, and by governments and other public institutions across the European Union .  .  ~  .  .  .  .  '  .  .  .  '  ' 
·"' 
~- -} .. 
. ..  -~ ... 
2 The situation in general 
Around  the globe,  the  Year 2000  (Y2K)  issue  is  being addressed  by  governments, 
industry, and international organisations with increasing attention and resources.  It  i;:; 
estimated by experts· that 1-trillion euro has already been spent worldwide to  investi~  .  - . 
gate, rectify,  te~t. and  audit IT systems. The G8 World Economic Summit in Cologne 
in  June  is  expected  to  discuss  it as  a .major issue  for  the  increasingly  networked 
global eoonomy. 
In the European Union, the Commission has continued to. convene meetings with na-
tional and sectqral experts from the Member States to exchange information on prog-
ress and experiences. 
.  .  .  . 
The Commission hosted a two-day meeting of EU  public infrastructure providers in 
April 1999, during which: 
the situation of key EU  infrastructure sectors was investigated in terms of pre-
paredness for' the roll-over to the next millennium; 
- areas were identified where significant cross-border and  cross-sector depend-
encies exist; 
- and the extent to which  th~se dependencies are being addressed was  identi-
fied: 
A more detailed analysis is attached in annex to this Report. 
At the Telecommunications,  Industry, Energy, Transport, and  lnternai Market Coun-
cils a consensus has emerged ori the importance and urgency with which this matter 
needs to be addressed. 
Positive developments 
Although the situation varies between sectors and in different countries, a number of 
,  important  t~ends are  now  emerging  acro~s all  infrastructure  sectors,  ~nd 
throughout  the EU as a whole. Positive developments are: 
•  Regulatory and supervisory authorities are increasingly involved i[l monitoring 
and auditing vita/infrastructure sectors. 
•  Co-ordination efforts are be(ng carried out by sectoral,  national,  and interna-
tional associations. 
•  Bilateral,· multilateral, end-to-end, and national testing is occurring~ 
c> 
•  Information campaigns_ are being planned or ongoing to maint~in public confi-
dence  .. 
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The Year 2000 computing (Y2K} problem however, is not simply an information tech-. 
nology (IT) system problem, but also concerns;  a number of key s.ectorial interde-
pendencies of·processes. These interdependencies exist at many levels, the most 
fundamental of which are those basic infrastructures which provide the essen-
tial services upon which all the sectors depend. The telecommunications sector de-
pends on electricity, and water. The energy sector on telecommunications and water:  · 
The  gas sector on  electricity, etc:  Disruptions in  on~ sector could  have a cascading 
effect on others.  . 
Many organisatio·ns completing their Y2K adaptation and test.[ngactivities are already 
shifting  .their  efforts  to  contingency' planning.  Their  scope of interest  is  becoming 
much  wider than. their· own .internal  environment,  inCluding  the  need· to  assess  the 
effect of external factors.lnevitab.ly,  concerns  arise  regarding  the preparedness of 
the suppliers of-essential services, in particular, areas such as energy,  trans~ 
port, telecommunications, finance, and water. 
Reasons for concern 
The  situation  within  the  European  Uflion  and  country  attitudes  to  the  problem  are 
neither  consistent  nor  homogeneous,. so  generalisations  should  be  avoided.  Fur-
. the'rm6re,  the  public institution-s do not have, and  are unlikely ever to have, full infor-
'mation to be able to make reasonable comparisons between  countri~s or sectors. 
Although ·.steady  progress  is  being  reported  overall  within  the  EU, there are  certain 
indications that not all .sectors in all Member States expect to be totally ready 
and  fully compliant  in  time.  A major element .in  this  is  the lack of available (verifi:-
able) information on  the  situation  particularly  in  relation to  the  potential  spill-over 
. effects between Member States. 
Ever:y sector consistently reports that,  in particUlar, smaller organisations continue 
to lag significantly behind large companies in  addressing the  Y2K ,problem,  and 
all  organisations  retain  a strong depende.ncy upon their IT  system suppliers to 
provide an accurate disclosure of the compliance of their products and. to de-
liver·timely compliant upgrades:  ·  ,'  ·  · 
A l')'lajor consideration is the need to give recognition to the important role  played  by 
regulatory authorities; as  well as by  organisations such  as  insurance  companies.  In 
the  coming  months,  these regulators and  insl.li"ance  companies  will have to take 
decisions concerning whether to continue to-license or certify certain compa-
nies to  con~ini.Je to operate,  and  whether to  provide  continued  insurance· cover. 
Due to the key role of infrastructures, such decisions may have an impact which goes 
well beyond the  particular company or  an  individual Member State. Issues of poten-
. tial civilliabiiity, also in a cross-border context, will need to be carefully examined. 
•  '  '  •  ·- •  I  •  • 
. ·.  .  .  .  ~  .  . .  . 
So  there is  a need  for greater co-operation  between  regulators to share the  strate~ · 
gies, criteria and information on which they will  bas_e such decisions. It is also neces-
sary however, for governments to back the decisions of the regulators. 
4 With regard to the situation beyond the Union's external borders, the assessment of 
possible safety issues in nuclear installations·  (power plants and other nuclear 
facilities) and poWer grids in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union is of 
perhaps the most concern and should continue to be addressed without delay. 
There is a-lack of  available (verifiable) information about the statf] of  prepared-
ness of key EU infrastructures On the basis of this information it is difficult to 
make a clear assessment. There are also certain indications that not air  sectors- ·  .  ' 
·in all Member States may be fully ready and compliant in time.  These are rea- · 
sons for concern. 
Political action is necessary 
- The interdependencies between sectors, the  importance of essential services, espe-
cially energy the dependency on external EU  supplie~ in sectors such as oil, gas and 
the need to ensure access to emergency telecommunications services, require po-
litical attention of Member States in order to minimise remaining risks arid to focus 
on contingency planning. 
Given  that disruptions to ·certain  cruc,ial  infrastructure services and supplies · 
may-possibly occur, and· indeed that the risk of accidents having unexpected spill-
over,  domino effects also  exists, EU  Member States must ensure that effective 
contingency  J>lans  are prepared  or,  in  case of existing. ones,  reviewed  and 
made. fully operational in time. Such contingency planning should be based on  co-
operation between the private and  public sectors; cater for a wide range of possible 
scenarios; and should take full account of trans-national dependencies. Since many 
existing  plans  will  assume  that  other infrastructures  continue  to  operate  normally, 
Y2K contingency plans will now also have to be verified against various scenarios in 
which other infrastructures may no longer be fully functional. 
An  important element in  addressing the Y2K issue is  the need to ensure that ade-
quate resources are devoted to its resolution by all both the public and the pri-
vate sectors. The may mean the need to establish priorities and,  if needed, tempo-
rarily move resources from other projects and activities. 
Given this situation, there is a clear political. responsibility of  the public institu-
tions at all levels to intensifY work on the Y2K issue, to reassess the weight .of 
its impact upon those areas under their responsibility, and to pay particular 
attention to transborder effects imd contingency planning. 
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On the basis of the above analysis, the Commission draws the following conclusions 
to. intensify near-term work on the "Millenium Bug": 
.  . Conclusions:  . 
·  2>  Member States should continue to make (ivailable ·the necessary information to 
the public, to other EU 'governments and  neighbouring countries on the state of 
preparedness ofJheir vital infrastructures and  services in  the  areas of energy, 
water,. food ·and  pharmaceutical  supply,  healthcare,  telecommunications,  fi-
nance, transport, and social security.  .  .  ' 
They should  ensure that regulators and  government authorities have the nec-
essary resources to carry out auditing tasks and take the appropriate measures 
in  cases where  safety and/or public health concerns arise,  supported  by  any 
appropriate policy action. 
'  '  . 
Regulators, and public authorities in the· Member States, in cooperation with in-
dustry, should finalise contingency and  safety_ plans, verify their functioning  in 
relation  to  infrastructure dependencies and  their effective cross-border opera-
. tions and, where necessary, reinforce co-ordination. 
~ Work should  inte~sify at all  levels, both tn  the private and  public sectors, includ- . 
~ilig  on-going  work being  undertaken  in. the  Council  wi~h the  assistance  of the  . 
Commission,  to  share  information  and  to  coordinate  actions,  in  particular with 
regard to the cross-border aspects of contingency and emergency planning,  in-
cluding the response during the critical period:.., 
c:>  The situation in relation to nuclear installations, in particular powerplants as· well 
as  powergrids~ in  the CEEC and. NIS countries and  the  possibie impact qn ·the  · 
EU is. of concern.· 
The Commission suggests ttiat Member States continue to make available tech-
nical expertise, in particular: 
,  . to the IAEA to assist countries in the auditing of their power plants, 
•  and. to support these countries in the assessment of their·power grids and  in 
developing and implementing appropriate C<?n.tingency plans. ANNEX to the Report of  the Commission to the European Council in Cologne 
on the preparedness of  Key EU infrastructures for the Y2000 date change 
The state of  preparedness in specific infrastructure sectors. 
Energy sectors in· general 
In the energy sectors, _utility  companies have generally be~n working on the problem 
for a number of years now and  within the  EU,  they are confident that their systems 
will  be  mostly Y2K compliant.  However,  many reports  still  cite  residual  pr~blems, 
delays,  and  uncertainties,  especially· with  respect to the  continuity of external  sup-
plies. 
.  I 
Electricity 
Electricity. is  a backbone of alt essential services. The quality of supply must not be 
reduced, nor should there be any comprof]lise on safety. The 1 January 2000 will oc-
cur on a Saturday .in  a holiday period, where demand is  likely to be  significantly be-
low maximum levels.  Nevertheless, there may be  f~ilures, likely to be  localised, 
which in the middle of winter could have serious consequences for the  areas 
concerned. Utilities must therefore undertake all possible preventative and  mitiga~ing 
measures, particularly adequate contingency planning .. _ 
An additional consideration is the so-called "grid problem", wh_ich  is of particular con-
cern in  CEEC. and the NIS. The unplanned shutdown of several power stations (nu-
clear  or thermal),  shutdown  of an  important  user,  or  problems .with  grid  control 
equipment could in turn' induce problems in power plants (nuclear or thermal)  . 
.  With  respect  to  cross  border flows,  European  utilities· are  adopting  a  policy  of in-
creasing .spinning reserves and retaining  th~ir connecting links in  operation,  but re-
ducing flows to a  minimum, thus fulfilling contractual obligations and also permitting 
mutual assistance' to be given if needed. 
Gas 
The gas supply organisations have been working for some time on making their sys-
tems compliant. Compared to electricity however, the cross border effect for natural 
gas is much  more significant.  Whereas  a  relatively  small  proportion  of electricity 
flows  across national borders - apart from  one  or two countries  ...., 43% of n·atural 
gas originates from outside the EU.  Moreover', 22% of the total energy demand is 
covered by gas.  These external supplies are obtained primarily from Russia, Algeria 
and Norway, and the gas must flow across several countries through major pipelines 
to reach the various destinations. 
To assure uninterrupted and safe gas delivery during  t~e millennium transition, even 
in  the  unlikely  situation  that  something  goes  wrong  either  internally  or externally, 
contingency  plans are  being  put in  place.  Remote-controlled  stations can  be  oper-
ated manually and additional stand-by personnel will be available. Alternative back-. 
up telecommunication  lines  and  private  radio  networks  are  being  established  and 
there is  an advance agreement with partners to maintain supply and to provide f!lU-
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ANNEX to the Report of  the Commission to  ·the European Council in. Cologne 
on the preparedness of  Key EU infrastructures for the Y2DDO date change 
tual. assistance  between  gas  companie~. Furthermore,  gas  storage  is  available  in 
every country to cover the normal consumption during a certain period of time. · 
Nevertheless, there may be ·a need to strengthen co-ordination at EU level in or- . 
der'to support national contingency planning activities should  an  interruptions 
occur to the normal supply of gas from a particular foreign country.  .  · 
·Oil and coal 
Oil  can  be  readily stored, thus those who are dependent on  this fuel for heating can·  - .  .  . 
have stocks in  place.  Moreover, for the oil supply industry as a whole, substantial oil 
stocks should exist, to meet the levels required under EU  legislation for general sup-
ply  security  reasons  (90  days  consumption  required  to  be  held  by  the  industry or 
designated agencies for each Member State). 
Nevertheless, the dependence on  non-EU oil .supplies, at nearly 80%, ·is high, 
. and as wi,th natural gas, it is not possible to be certain of the effect of Y2K on external 
producer countries: Member States should  therefore ensure that contingency plans 
are able .to deal with any temporary disruption in supplies, and confirm that measures 
.have been taken for the key installations within_ their territory. 
Furthermore, it is possible that there might be a surge in demand by custome_rs for oil 
products such as gasoline or heating oil as the critical period  is approached and  re-
. serve stocks are built up:  Suppliers may need to--prepare for this, as well as for. pos-
sible disruptions to  the  supply chain  itself,  by  making use of 'their own· storage and. 
flexibility measures. Those installing stand-by generators will also need to have ade- · 
quate fuel stocks in place. 
·. 
The. coal sector is perhaps the energy form of least general concern with  re-
spect to the Y2K problem.  In  part,  this js because indigenous production of coal  in 
the  EU  has declined considerably.  It is  clear however that the  companies  involved 
must take measures to prevent disruption to their production. Likewise, consumption 
is rather concentrated,  and  is  mainly accounted for by  power generation,  steel and 
other industry,  thougti  these  users  too  will.need  to  take  measures  to  assure  their 
supplies and to hold an appropriate level of stocks. 
_.Nuclear safety 
There are two main sources of concern related to nuclear power plants.  ~irst, there is 
a  risk  that  on-site  systems  may fail.  Although  it is  claimed  that· only  limited  use  is 
made of digital  logic in  safety-related systems, there  is  a possible risk that multiple· 
failures in  other systems, while not intrinsically. unsafe iri  themselves, could overload 
nuclear power plant  operators and  induce errors.  Second,  there are  concerns  th.at 
any' unplanned shutdown of several power stations (nuclear or the.rmal),' or any shut-
down  of an  important user or problems with  grid .  control. equipment  could  provoke . 
grid  problems, which in  turn could  induce problems in  power plants (nuclear or ther-
mal}.· 
Inside the European Union 
Member States with operating nuclear power plants have action plans to address the 
issue.  These action  plans  differ in  detail  but each  requires .the  operator to  identify  .  . 
/ 
8· ANNEX to the Report of the Commission to the European Council in Cologne 
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systems that might be  affected, to rank them by nuclear safety significance,  to test 
each in  turn and to address any· failures.  Regulatory authorities are reviewing  these 
action  plans  and  are  monitoring their execution. Most reactor operators report they 
will  be  Y2K ready by  mid-1999:  It will be  up to Member States and  their regulatory 
authorities to ensure that this is .inde,ed  the case and provide the necessary informa-
.  tion, and confidence, to the public. 
Outside the European Union 
Regarding CEEC and NIS,  the general view is that there is a lack of confidence 
that the two main sources of concern have been appropriately checked (in-
cluding contingency plans). This concerns primarily the  50 nuclear power plants 
but also research  facilities,and  other nuclear facilities.  Despite  the  claimed,  limited 
Lise·  of digital  logic  in  safety  related  systems. in  eastern  European  nuclear  power 
plants, there are Y2K problems with some systems. Special attention should be paid 
tq newer equipment installed recently. 
The  International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) .is  addres~ing the  Y2K problem  on 
nuclear power plant sites. The  IAEA will organise assessments over the next two to 
three  month~. followed by a phase of contingency planning (Chernobyl has been as-
sessed). Its immediate needs relate to the assessment ph~se, to be implemented by 
small. tea ins of Western experts, in  co-operation with local operators. The  IAEA has 
already requested the Commission support for. inspection missions to three 
nuclear power plants (Kozloduy - Bulgaria, Zaporozhe - Ukraine, a still to be iden-
tified  plant  in. Russia),  but  is  expected  to  request  further  assistance  in  the  next 
months. The  IAEA assessment teams will  report back and  a clearer- picture  of the 
nee.ds will begin to emerge by July. Given this late date, It is unlikely that requests for 
replacement, compliant equipment can be  addressed by the end. of the year.  There-
fore the focus must be on contingency planning. 
The Commission services are discussing the  practiq:~l modalities of this support with 
the IAEA and the World A$sociation of Nucl~ar Operators (WANO). The Commission 
has  asked  WANO  to  undertake  the  IAEA assessment  at  all  the  sites  where  it  is 
needed; as such a scheme  wot,.~ld minimise the administrative burden, maximise the 
use of expertise, and ensure the ·comparability of results and the contingencies to be 
proposed. 
The  International Science and  Technology Centre  (ISTC)  in  Moscow established a 
special fund  (1.35  M$ currently pledged) to  help Russian and NIS institutions solve 
Y2K issues, using staff of former weapon research institutes. ISTC funds will support 
co-ordination of the definition of methodologies, assist Minatom and other institutions 
in  projects  to  implement practical  Y2K solutions,  identify international  collaboration 
and assist in  pr~>Vision of specific international expertise.  However, no guarantees 
can be given that assessments are performed in time,  nor that contingency 
plans will be ready. 
As  far as  the  Commission  is  aware, at present no international organisation is 
· able to co-ordinate  ·an. assessment of the risk .presented by "grid failure" h1  the. 
CEEC or NIS.  In  view of the  potenti~l risk to nuclear power plants,  to  impo_rts  from 
NIS (e.g. gas) and  the general risk to citizens in the CEEC/NIS, urgent attention 
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on the preparedness of  Key EU infrastructures for the Y2000 date change 
. needs to be paid to this issue:· Further funds  need  to be  made  ayailable  immedi-
ately for such an assessment.  · 
Water supply and waste,water treatment  . 
f1J1any  other sectors rely on water supply. Although activities in  this area have gener-
-ally had· a late start,  the water supply and wastewater· treatment sectors  in  the  EU 
have recognised the threat posed.by the millennium bug and progress  i~ rep-orted.  -
With  respect  to  wastewat~r. most countries  report that  s~parate- ministry and  local 
government bodies are responsible, Each is therefore responsible for its own millen-
nium.projects, including contingency planning. This sector is dependent upon energy 
for its operation.  Problems .might arise due to temporary breakdowns of wastewater· 
pumpillg statipns and due to a reductjon of the efficiency of treatment plants. The first 
could cause .local problems with wastewater disposal;-the second also could  lead  to 
an  increase in  to  water pollution  downstream of .the  wastewater discharge.  Limited 
ser-Vices- can  be  provided  when  norr:nal  resources  are. unavailable.  The  sector  is 
making progress, .although supplier dependencies are of concern pecause the lack of 
information on certain technical installations.  · 
The  main risk identified in the sector is· the possibility of pollution of surface 
waters used for drinking water abstraction intake from major rivers as  a· conse- __ · 
. quence of the millennium problem. 
Telecommunications 
.  - .  . 
The overall general dependency on .telecommunications networks is  a simple,  if ob-
vious,  part of lhe shift  to  the  information  age.  All  sectors  need  to  !?Ommunicate  to 
function.  - ·  · 
An important  difference be~een the telecommunications sector and  other sectors is 
that while  some expect lower than  normal demands, the !elecommunications sector 
will probably be overloaded by people calling to wish _each  ottier a happy ·millennium. 
Network saturation has been read-led  in the  past in  similar circumstances.  Morea-
.  ver,  this  naturally occurring dema'nd  is  likely to be aggravated by an  increase in  the· 
number of faults and accidents occurring in other sectors which- will require use.of the· 
'tele~;:ommunicatiori networks in  seeking to obtain remedial action.  The strong possi-
bilities of network saturation  gives iise to  the clear need to ensure a continuing 
priority to emergency and other essential services.  - -
There is  no  reasonable expectation  that the  infrastructure will  be  enhanced. to  deal 
_ with ·it.  This  is  a  transient  problem,  independent .from- the  IT  effects  of the  date 
- .  .  l 
change, which can be  managed  by various techniques. There is a need tor detailed 
. discussions to take place in order to. ~nsure  t~,at emergency services can be reached-· 
during the peak period and that network saturation is mitigated for this purpqse. 
Like electricity,  telecommunications  is  a real  time  service,  which -cannot  be  stored. 
Unlike -electricity,  spare capacity  in  one  place  cannot  neGessarily  be transferred  to 
assist if there is congestion elsewhere. 
10 ANNEX to'the Report of  the Commission to the-European Council in Cologne 
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A  further  characteristic of telecommunic~tions networks,  one  that  they  share  with 
other sectors,  is  the limited possibility to  carry out real-life testing,  A service that  is 
relied upon every minute of every day cannot be switched off to allow testing. 
The main. telecommunication networks _are  dependent on  electricity.  Short breaks in 
supply should be handled by the generators a_nd  batteries already in place. 
Substantial  activities  are  ongoing at international  and  national  level  to  ensure  tha~ 
networks are ·prepared. However, it is considered that operators outside the EU  may 
not be  equally  well  prepared  and  that disruption to the international telephone 
and fax networks cannot be excluded. Recognising the scale of the threat posed 
by  potential Year 2000 computer failures and  the critical  role played by the globally 
· deployed  teleGOf)lmunications networks,  the  International  Telecommunication  Union . 
(ITU) established a Year 2000 Task Force in March 1998.  Activities include a review 
of expected states of readiness of all major operators world wide,  an  extensive pro-
gramme  of ·inter-regional  testing,  the  sharing  of information  and  the  promotion  of 
contingency plc:mning.  · 
Important work is still required in this area, as other sectors rely upon the con-
tir1Ued  availability. of_  telecommunications  for  their  own  contingency  plans. 
Telecommunications  is  the  prime  tool  for  reporting  outages or other issues  which 
could have an impact on the economy as a ~hole.  · 
Aviation 
The parties involved in tbis sector - airlines, ATC service providers, airports, national 
regulators  and  certification  bodies  - report  that  they  have  reached  an  advanced 
stage in their preparations to ensure Y2K compliance.  lh particular, safety and secu-
rity  systems  are  being  upgraded  and  tested  in  accordance with  well-defined  man-
agement plans; although commercial and facilitation applications, notably in airports, 
are  not yet completely tested  and  full  Y2K compliance will  probably not be entirely _ 
_  guaranteed. 
Although both regulatory authorities and industry (Eurocontrol, JAA) have expressed 
confidence with regard to the state of compliance, given the paramount importance of 
safety, contingency plans are being developed which would  ensure safe operations 
even  in  a worst...,case  scenario.  Thes~ will  be_  based  largely on  well-established op-
erational  procedures,  which  are  being  reviewed  to  ensure their appropriateness to 
address Y2K issues. Whilst contingency plans will cover immediate safety concerns 
· satisfactorily,  the  possibility of certain  capacity  constraints occurring  during the  im-
mediate period following the changeover _cannot be excluded. 
The  two  most critical  cross-sector dependencies are telecommunications  and  elec- ·. 
tricity.  Contingency plans include the use .of satellite  phpnes and  diesel generators, 
but these are emergency back-ups and not real solutions.  Efforts for cross sector co-
operation, carried out at l9cal and nationallevel,-should be reinforeed. 
The overall preparations by Western EL!ropean industry appear to be well advanced, 
but the  dsks associated with  cross-border interactions with  neighbouring  regions  of 
the  European  Union  remain  to  be  assessed  more fully.  Information on  the  wea~er 
components of the.  air transport chain, including certain national regulators, is not yet 
forthcoming but should be provided through the report of the  International Civil Avia-
tion Organisation, due mid-1999. The aviation industry is being advised. by regulators 
11 
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that if they are not satisfied with Y2K  compli~nce and they have safety concerns, ac-
tion will be taken to with~raw operating authorisations.  . 
Maritime transport 
Although the potential of Y2K to create problems in  the  maritime sector may appear 
less significant than in aviation, many vessels· carry cargoes-that are essential for the 
economy,  so  any  interruption  in  the  logistic  chain  c6uld  have  serious  and  wide- . 
spread consequences. Furthermore, there are potential dangers to the environment · 
with some cargoes,. if safe handling eari  not be .a·ssured.  Attention  has been  paid .to 
safety 'critical functions both at sea  and  in  ports.  However, doubts remain about cer-
tain  functions  and  the  compliance of some ship  owners,  particularly those  with  so-
.called 'flags of convenience'.  ' 
There is a need to reach agreement between the different authorities on the questiori 
of how to  handle suspected  substandard  ships ·during  the  changeover period.  The 
work of the shipping and  port associations has identified the need to allow all parties· 
concerned to have the  possibility to control ship movements; either by. requiring ves-
sels not to enter or leave ports, or for ship captains to decicje to remain at sea if they 
suspect problems onshore. 
EU  maritime and  port associations. are. continuing to  urge members to adopt contin-
gency plans: further efforts are needed to ensure full C?Ompliance. 
Rail tran_sport 
- There are a number of .different IT systems used  by  railways  in WQiCh  problems of . 
compliance could  arise.  Non-compliance is  unlikely to compromise safety but could 
disrupt rail traffic or services to freight and  passenger customers.  Ensuring the com-
pliance  of the  interconnections  between  the. railways'  IT  systems  is  a  particularly 
complex  task.  While  components  of this.  network  have  been  checked,  end-to-end 
· tests have not beeri carried out. 
Regulators are generally taking the leading ·role in the assessment of business conti-
. nuity_ aspects, as well as  safety aspects.- Audits are being  performed and the results· 
kept  under  review.  Risks  are  limited  in  this  sector,  primarily  associated  with  the 
power supply and tbe international context.  Minor and limited disturbance to locai in-
formation systems for passengers cannot be excluded.  · 
Finance sector 
In th'~ EU,  as  els~where, the  financial  sector is  still  generally considered. to  b~ the . 
most advanced sector, although it is· also  dep~ndent on_ other crucial  infrastructures 
such as electricity and telecommunications, 
As  far as  the  internaL preparation  of financial  institutions ·is  concerned,  certain. EU 
countries noted that thei(financial organisations had  tended to delay their year 2000 
adaptation processes, due to. the fact that the changeover to the euro was  receiving 
·high priority in the financial sector. However, this has had a generally positive result. 
Indeed, all  institutions of the four financial  serv]ces· sectors (banking, insurance.  se-
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curities,  payment systems)  have  undergone  an  exercise  of parallel  euro  and  Year 
2000 adaptation projects. 
The  euro ·  changeover  has  had  another  benefit,  in  that  many  of  the  contingency 
strategies for Y2K are being  based  upon the contingency measures adopted for the 
· ewo changeover. ·the successful· experience  of EU  financial  institutions  in  coping 
with the similar euro changeover challenge  h~s  ge~erated confidence in the ability of 
companies to implement such changes successfully. 
However, there is  a tendency to ·underestimate risks  not directly associated with in-
formation system failures (credit risks,  liquidity problems,  business-to-business risks, 
systemic disruptions, coverage of client Y2K risks,  and· litigation). Although these is-
sues have been identified as potential problem sources, firms have concentrated on 
their internal adaptation programmes and may nqw lack the resources, time,  or sim-
ply the  ability to take appropriate measures  in  order to  protect themselves  against 
such risks. 
Furthermore,  the supply of information to  the  public  by  the  financial sector and  by. 
public financial authorities could still be improved. Many companies have yet to adopt 
proactive strategies to disclose to the public their Year 2000 situation. These organi-
sations may be underestimating the impaCt of their attitude, not only to the public but 
also to the potential impact on international financial.markets as there is a risk of tur-
moil  being generated by the erroneus or ill-informed opinion  of certain  international 
financial experts.  If this were to persist,  this lack of attention could  impair the com-
petitive position ,of the European financial sector,  in  spite of the substantial progress· 
which has indeed been made. · ·  ·  · 
Food and pharmaceutical supply chains 
The supply chains which are of .greatest importance at a national level are the food. 
and pharmaceutical supply chains. Within the EU, the major food manufacturers and 
retailers are collaborating to share information and experience, and to develop prac-
tical  business  continuity  plans.  It  is  imperative  that  this  sector  continues  to  co-
. operate, particularly in forecasting customer behaviour and predicting demand well in 
advance, thus ensuring that supply will  be  able to meet possible  unusual surges in 
demand towards the end of 1999  . 
. There is a similar rationale for the need to take action in the pharmaceutical sector. 
The European pharmaceutical industry must work together with  hospitals to  identify 
their requirements for medicinal products during·the critical period, and also to inform 
the public of their progress and  plans.  Between the US  and Canada, there is a mu-
tual agreement that their hospitals will not stockpile mediCines. Once again, an addi-
. tiona!  concern  is the  external  situation,  since  many  of the  active  drug  substances 
used to manufacture prescription generic pharmaceuticals originate outside the· EU. 
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Healthcare 
.  .  . 
Healthcare  is  gener~lly dealt with  at  local  level  by  individual  hospital~ in  Member 
States,  although  some  countries .  have  establi~hed  national  co-ordination  mecha-
nisms. to  share  information .between  hospita.ls.  There  is  no  intetnational  body  ad-
dressing the sector and  no exchange,of information taking  place between coul")tries. 
The main problem identified in. this sector-is the difficulty in obtaining infqrmation from  . 
suppliers on  the Compliance of products,  especially electronic machines for medical 
and  health· purposes containing embeddep chips,-in  use within  hospitals. This is  an 
area where Member States, particularly at iocallevel, need to be vigilant. 
'  .  - . "  .  '  .  ~ 
Social welfare payments and tax collection 
For the public sector, key services which have to function are welfare payments and' 
tax collection. Most Member States report that they are devoting particular attention 
to the IT systems in  these areas.  It may·be necessary to consider the availability of 
temporary,  emergency cas_h  pay-out systems to ensure that"  citiz~ns continue to .re-
ceive welfare payments  . 
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